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Non-traditional motor fuels are receiving increased
attention and use. This paper examines the safety of three
alternative gaseous fuels plus gasoline and the
advantages and disadvantages of each. The gaseous fuels
are hydrogen, methane (natural gas), and propane.
Qualitatively, the overall risks of the four fuels should be
close. Gasoline is the most toxic. For small leaks,
hydrogen has the highest ignition probability and the
gaseous fuels have the highest risk of a burning jet or
cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increased use of non-traditional motor
vehicle fuels in place of gasoline, the issue of safety with
these fuels must be addressed. Each potential replacement
for gasoline holds some safety advantages and
disadvantages. This paper gives a comparison of several
of the leading gaseous fuels, herein called gases, and
gasoline. The gaseous fuels of interest are hydrogen,
propane (liquefied petroleum gas [LPG]), and methane
(natural gas). Hydrogen may be cryogenic liquid (LH2) or
compressed (CH2). Natural gas may be compressed
(CNG) or liquid (LNG). There have been several
published studies performing general comparisons, and
these will be drawn upon in this work. This discussion
focuses on the physical and chemical hazards associated
with fuel handling for the four subject fuels. Table I gives
some general data on the fuels under consideration.
II. PHYSICAL HAZARDS
There are several physical hazards inherent with each
type of motor fuel. The physical hazards with fuels are
addressed here as energy forms: acoustic, electrical,
thermal, and pressure energies. Other energies, such as
gravitational, kinetic, mechanical, and vibration energies
are not treated in detail because, according to the
operating experiences, these energies are not major safety
concerns for handling motor fuels. Each of the identified
energy forms is discussed below.
II.A. Acoustic Energy
The acoustic energy generated by gas flowing
through lines can create acoustic frequencies, typically
several hundred hertz, and subsequently cause fatigue
failure of the components involved. Melese and Katz
discuss the design for acoustics in gas flow.
1
However,
acoustic vibration is usually a concern only for large gas
flows of many kg/s to Mg/s; vehicle fueling will be much
less than that level of flow.
This difference in flow rates does not imply that
acoustics can be ignored in design. Acoustics must be
considered in the analysis of gas piping systems, but other
hazards are more prevalent for common users. The
analogous situation with liquids, such as gasoline, is
pressure pulsations (referred to as “water hammer”). Like
the fuel gases, the liquid pressure and flow rate are low in
refueling. Therefore, water hammer or pressure pulsation
is only an issue with large flow applications: bulk
deliveries, pipelines, or other large-scale operations.
II.B Electrical Energy
Electrical energy as discussed here dwells on
electrostatic charge. Three scenarios should be
considered: when vehicles travel, when they are refueled,
and when persons refueling have an electrostatic charge.
When motor vehicles travel they can acquire an
electrostatic charge. This charge dissipates quickly
(seconds or less) through the resistance of tires and
concrete surfaces (asphalt surfaces are more resistive than
concrete). When fuel is dispensed into an automobile, if
the refueling nozzle is in metal-to-metal contact with the
fill opening (that is, electrically bonded to the car) then no
special provisions are needed for the electrostatic charge
generated by flowing hydrocarbon fuel. The third issue is
electrostatic charge on persons performing refueling. The
safety issue is that electrostatic discharges in the
fractional milliJoule (mJ) energy range are adequate to
ignite gasoline vapor and fuel gases.
2
In his case history
of process plant disasters, Kletz discusses an event where
a man drove to a gasoline station to refuel.
3
The attendant
Table I. Properties of Hydrogen, Methane, Propane, and Gasoline
Property
a Hydrogen Methane Propane Gasoline
Molecular Weight, amu 2.016 16.043 44.097 107
Triple point pressure, atm 0.0695 0.1159 1E-09 —
Triple point temperature, K 13.803 90.68 85.48 180 to 220
Normal boiling point (NBP) temperature, K 20.268 111.632 231.11 310 to 478
Critical pressure, atm 12.759 45.387 41.937 24.5 to 27
Critical temperature, K 32.976 190.56 369.82 540 to 569
Density at critical point, g/cm
3
0.0314 0.1604 0.2163 0.23
Density of liquid at triple point, g/cm
3
0.077 0.4516 —
Density of solid at triple point, g/cm
3
0.06865 0.4872 —
Density of vapor at triple point, g/m
3
125.597 251.53 —
Density of liquid at NBP, g/cm
3
0.0708 0.4226 0.582 0.7
Density of vapor at NBP, g/cm
3
0.00134 0.00182 0.00242 0.0045
Density of gas at NTP, g/m
3
83.764 651.19 1858 4400
Density ratio: NBP liquid to NTP gas 845 649 313 156
Heat of fusion, J/g 58.23 58.47 94.98 161
Heat of vaporization, J/g 445.59 509.88 425.31 309
Heat of sublimation, J/g 507.39 602.44 —
Heat of combustion (low), kJ/g 119.93 50.02 46.45 44.5
Heat of combustion (high), kJ/g 141.86 55.53 50.48 48
Energy density, MJ/liter 8.49 21.14 22.8 31.15
Specific heat (Cp) of NTP gas, J/g-K 14.89 2.22 1.625 1.62
Specific heat (Cp) of NBP liquid, J/g-K 9.69 3.5 2.213 2.2
Specific heat ratio (Cp/Cv) of NTP gas 1.383 1.308 1.131 1.05
Specific heat ratio (Cp/Cv) of NBP liquid 1.688 1.676 —
Viscosity of NTP gas, g/cm-s 0.0000875 0.00011 0.000079 0.000052
Viscosity of NBP liquid, g/cm-s 0.000133 0.00113 0.0019 0.002
Thermal conductivity of NTP gas, mW/cm-K 1.897 0.33 0.152 0.112
Thermal conductivity of NBP liquid, mW/cm-K 1 1.86 1.34 1.31
Surface tension, N/m 0.00193 0.01294 0.00702 0.0122
Dielectric constant of NTP gas 1.00026 1.00079 1.0020 1.0035
Dielectric constant of NBP liquid 1.233 1.6227 1.93
Index of refraction of NTP gas 1.00012 1.0004 1.0017
Index of refraction of NBP liquid 1.11 1.2739 1.39
Adiabatic sound velocity in NTP gas, m/s 1294 448 249 154
Adiabatic sound velocity in NBP liquid, m/s 1093 1331 1155
Compressibility factor (Z) of NTP gas 1.0006 1.0243 1.0193 1.0069
Compressibility factor (Z) in NBP liquid 0.01712 0.004145 0.00643
Gas constant (R), cm
3
-atm/g-K 40.7037 5.11477 1.86083 0.77
Isothermal bulk modulus of NBP liquid, MN/m
2
50.13 456.16 763
Volume expansivity (b) of NBP liquid, /K 0.01658 0.00346 0.0012
Percentage of thermal energy radiated from
diffusion flame to surroundings, %
17–25 23–32 27-30 30–42
a. NTP = 1 atm and 20°C (293.15 K) normal temperature and pressure
NBP= normal boiling point.
handed the man the car’s gas cap to hold while the
attendant fueled the car. While holding the gas cap, the
man removed his pullover sweater. The man was wearing
non-conducting footwear (i.e., rubber-soled shoes), so the
electrostatic charge generated by removing the sweater
did not dissipate to the ground. When the man began to
replace the gas cap, the static charge created a spark that
jumped from the gas cap to the car’s gas fill port. The
spark provided sufficient energy to ignite the gasoline
vapors in the air near the port and a fire started at the
refueling nozzle. The fire was quickly extinguished. Note
that this fire could not have propagated into the fill nozzle
because the gasoline vapor mixture is much too rich in the
fill port. Electrostatic charge buildup is an important
factor in motor fuel safety for both gasoline vapors and
gaseous fuels. Proper grounding and bonding is necessary
to prevent fuel combustion during handling operations. In
general, existing codes and standards address proper
bonding: the fill nozzle must contact the fill port.
II.C. Thermal Energy
Thermal energy refers to the thermodynamic state of
the fuels under scrutiny. Hydrogen may be used at
cryogenic temperature (20 K) or at ambient temperature,
depending on the means used to store fuel on the vehicle.
Methane may also be used at cryogenic temperature
(111 K) or at ambient temperature, and propane is usually
pressure-liquefied gas at several atmospheres pressure and
ambient temperature (300 K). Gasoline is typically used
at ambient temperature as well.
The inherent thermal energy of cryogenic liquids or
cold gases poses hazards to people. Contact or immersion
on bare skin can freeze body parts.
4
A typical person’s
skin temperature is 35°C (95°F). Cooling skin by
exposing it to liquid, cold gas, or cold metal parts that
reduce the skin’s temperature to below 3°C (27°F)
causes the formation of ice crystals in the body’s skin
cells.
5
Even escaping propane gas jets can be very cold
and have cooled skin sufficiently to produce burns.
6,7
Propane fill hose leaks have cooled enough to freeze a
consumer’s hand to the fill nozzle, which is typically a
concern with LNG or LH2. Of all these fuels, gasoline is
the most benign at ambient temperature.
II.D. Pressure Energy
Pressure energy discussed here refers to the storage
pressure of the fuel onboard the vehicle or at the refueling
station. Hydrogen might be stored at low pressure as a
cryogenic liquid (i.e.,  0.3 MPa) or at very high pressure
as a compressed gas (up to  60 MPa). Methane is
expected to have similar properties,  0.2 MPa as a
cryogenic liquid or up to  40 MPa as a compressed gas.
Propane at 300 K liquefies at  4 MPa, so the operating
pressure would be slightly above that threshold. Gasoline
is stored a very low pressure of 0.1 MPa. For this form
of energy, gasoline is the most benign of the fuels
considered.
Note that cryogenic pressures are not a threat unless
confinement is lost. Without confinement, large liquid-to-
gas expansions can occur, which can generate reasonably
high pressures in the cold gases. High-pressure gases
present several hazards. Exposure to a high-pressure gas
jet at close range, such as if a fault occurred during
refueling line handling, can lead to skin incision and skin
injection injuries. Brauer states that such injuries can
occur at 4.4 MPa and higher.
8
The eyes are a particular
concern because of their fragility under high-pressure
exposure. All of the gaseous fuels pose a hazard in this
regard. As a generality, physicians express greatest
concern when a non-toxic gas injects foreign materials
into the skin (e.g., metal shavings, dust, oil, or rust
particles from the gas system). Otherwise, non-toxic gases
will tend to evolve back out of the skin, but at a much
slower rate than that at which the gas entered (i.e., days or
weeks versus seconds).
Another pressure concern is hose whip. If the
refueling hose were to become disconnected or fail while
under pressure, the escaping gas would propel the hose at
high velocity with random, unpredictable motion. In the
nuclear industry, a pipe whip analysis has traditionally
been performed for a breached, steel-walled pipe when
the system pressure was over 1.9 MPa, so flexible hose
whip would be a concern at lower pressures.
9
Workers in
other industries (e.g., spray painting, sand blasting, and
compressed air supply for pneumatic tools) often use
tethers, called “whip checks,” on hoses to reduce the
threat of being struck by a whipping hose. Impulse
impacts from a flailing hose could be physiologically
damaging for the MPa gas pressures under consideration.
Thus, there are engineered safety features of positive
connection fittings on the gas lines and quick shutoff
valves to limit gas flow.
A further consideration is the stored pressure energy
in the station and vehicle tanks. If any part of the pressure
boundary fails, such as a fitting or instrument, it could be
propelled outward at high velocity because of the high
pressures. Using formulas from Baum for an arbitrarily
selected 50-gram piece propelled from the hydrogen,
methane, or propane pressurized gas systems gives values
of well over 79 J for hydrogen and methane, and  10 J
for propane.
10
A fragment is generally considered to
produce a critical injury or lethal hazard if its kinetic
energy is 79 J or greater, although fragments with 40 to
60 J can also cause serious wounds.
11
With a person
standing between the pump unit and vehicle tank, the
likelihood of being struck by a failed part expelled under
pressure is reasonably high. Therefore, pressure part
failures are important for high-pressure gas storage of
gaseous motor fuels. The stored energy in pressurized gas
systems must be respected; even 13 MPa gas cylinders
weighing 62 kg have sufficient thrust to launch
themselves upward at velocities of tens of m/s when the
gas valve has been sheared from the cylinder body.
12
Table II gives a comparison of the results from these
potential hazards. In general, engineering controls have
been designed and installed on traditional and alternate
fuel vehicle refueling stations, particularly natural gas
refueling stations, to manage the hazards.
13–20
A final pressure consideration is the occupational
injury rates from gasoline stations. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics data shows a total recordable injury case rate of
3.6, 3.4, and 3.4 cases per 100 full-time workers for the
years 2003 through 2005 for code 447 (gasoline stations),
respectively.
21
These values are roughly 25% below the
U.S. national average for total recordable injury rates.
Therefore, the gasoline station employees are either
protected by engineering control measures or the work
they are employed to perform is of a non-hazardous
nature (i.e., cashier or clerk rather than hands-on work as
attendants). Presently, the number of alternate fuel
stations in the U.S. is only about 5,000; there is no
individual labor code for workers at these stations.
III. CHEMICAL HAZARDS
There are two areas of chemical safety concern when
considering refueling with motor vehicle fuels. The first is
the chemical toxicity of the fuel, and the second is
combustibility. Both of these issues are important to
workers in all parts of the chemical processs industry as
well as consumers.
III. A. Toxicity
As an indication of toxicity, the suggested temporary
emergency exposure limits (TEELs) for public exposures
from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are given in
Table III.
22
TEEL-0 is a low concentration to which
almost any person could be exposed without harm on an
indefinite time basis. The American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) gives
allowable threshold limit values (TLVs) for workers;
these are given in Table III for comparison.
23
The ACGIH
values are widely accepted in the U.S. and abroad. The
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) health
hazard values in the table came from Fire Protection
Guide to Hazardous Materials.
24
Chemical toxicity has been a continual issue with
gasoline. The ACGIH has identified gasoline as a
confirmed animal carcinogen with unknown relevance to
humans,
23
and the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC) has cited gasoline as possibly
carcinogenic to humans.
25
The IARC points out that
gasoline is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons, including
2–3% benzene, and benzene is positively carcinogenic to
humans. There have been a number of research studies of
station personnel and customer exposures to gasoline
during refueling station operations.
26–32
As shown in the
studies, public exposure to gasoline during refueling is
typically small for two reasons: the exposure time is
generally brief in any given month (gasoline flows at
 10 gpm at refueling stations so typical automobiles only
require a few minutes per refueling session and people do
not always stand near the self-service refueling nozzle),
and some states require vapor recovery systems to capture
vapors emanating from the vehicle tank fill port. Hakkola
and Saarinen give data considered to be representative of
consumer exposures.
26
They show that average customer
exposures to gasoline hydrocarbons are 29 ppm with a
high value of 180 ppm in refueling sessions where the
gasoline vapors were not collected, and an average of
6 ppm with a high value of 44 ppm for refueling with
gasoline vapor recovery systems. The vapor recovery
system showed a significant exposure decrease of a factor
of  4. Comparing these exposures to the limits in
Table III shows there is little cause for concern with these
levels, even for the non-vapor recovery systems. Another
potential concern besides vapor inhalation is skin contact
or dermal exposure. Dermal exposure to gasoline has
proven to be a skin irritant, but not a significant chemical
irritant. Only long duration dermal exposures of several
hours have produced severe skin irritation.
33
Table II. Potential for Fuel-related Injury from Several Energy Sources
Fuel Acoustic Energy Electrostatic Energy Thermal Energy Pressure Energy
CH2 Low concern High concern, must prevent Low concern High concern
LH2 Low concern High concern, must prevent High concern Moderate concern
CNG Low concern High concern, must prevent Low concern High concern
LNG Low concern High concern, must prevent High concern Moderate concern
Propane Low concern High concern, must prevent Low concern High concern
Gasoline Low concern High concern, must prevent Low concern Low concern
Table III. Allowable Exposures to Respirable Vapors and Gases
Fuel
TEEL-0
(ppm) ACGIH TLV (ppm) Comments
Gasoline 300 300 NFPA health hazard = 1
(irritant, breathing protection may be needed, slight health hazard)
Hydrogen 4,000 Simple asphyxiant gas NFPA health hazard = 0
(ordinary combustible material)
In a static atmosphere room, H2 would have to reach >60,000 ppm
to displace O2 to reach the 19.5% O2 level defined as an oxygen
deficient atmosphere. H2 lower flammable limit is 4% in air, or
40,000 ppm, so that is a greater safety concern. From the TEEL
explanations, TEEL-0 is 10% LEL or 4,000 ppm for H2.
Methane 1,000 1,000 NFPA health hazard = 2
(intense or continued exposure could cause injury or incapacitation)
Propane 1,000 1,000 NFPA health hazard = 2
(intense or continued exposure could cause injury or incapacitation)
Gasoline leakage into ground water has also been a
large concern across the U.S.
34
Gasoline entry into the
ground water can lead to ingestion of hydrocarbons,
benzene, etc. via drinking water. Leaking underground
storage tanks have been a continual source of concern for
gasoline service stations. In a 2004 publication, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that
over 1.5 million substandard tanks had been closed and
300,000 petroleum leaks had been cleaned up.
35
The gaseous fuels do not have the same level of
toxicity concern as gasoline and also have higher ppp
exposure levels than gasoline. None are suspected
carcinogens. Hydrogen is a simple asphyxiant gas with an
NFPA health hazard rating of zero and no ACGIH
threshold limit value. If hydrogen is stored as a cryogen
or under pressure, then dermal contact is an important
concern, but there is no chemical toxicity. Methane and
propane have generalized inhalation exposure limits, as
cited in Table III, based solely on their aliphatic
hydrocarbon molecular structure. A report about two LPG
accidents has suggested that persons exposed to gradually
increasing levels of LPG in air may suffer from a central
nervous system suppression effect, or LPG poisoning, that
begins with nausea and headache while the blood
concentration of propane increases with increasing
concentration and prolonged exposure.
36
However, this is
exposure to high concentrations of LPG, up to a few % of
atmosphere, that caused persons in unventilated trenches
to collapse; these symptoms are also associated with
oxygen deprivation. Propane is generally considered to
not be a toxicological threat, just an air displacement
threat, and methane is typically considered to be
biologically inert.
37,38
Like hydrogen, these gases can
displace air but are not regarded to be chemically toxic.
Table IV. Combustion Properties of Hydrogen, Methane, Propane, and Gasoline
Property Hydrogen Methane Propane Gasoline
Quenching gap in NTP air, mm 0.64 2.03 1.78 2.0
Limits of flammability in air, volume % 4–75 5–15 2.1–9.5 1.4–7.6
Limits of detonation in air, volume % 18.3–59 6.3–13.5 3.4–7 1.5–3.3
Minimum spark energy in air for deflagration
ignition, mJ
0.02 0.29 0.305 0.24
Autoignition temperature, K 858 813 740 501–744
Flame temperature in air, K 2,318 2,148 2,243 2,470
Maximum burning velocity in NTP air, cm/s 278 37–45 43–52 37–43
Energy release from stoichiometric mixture, MJ/m
3
3.58
(30% H2)
3.58
(9.5% CH4)
3.79
(4.0% C3H8)
3.91
(2% vapor)
NFPA flammability rating 4 4 4 3
NFPA instability rating 0 0 0 0
Data sources: Refs. 24 and 39.
III.B Combustion
Combustion can occur in many forms. Table IV gives
some combustion properties of the four fuels under
consideration. For combustible gases, there is either a pre-
mixed flame or a diffusion flame. A pre-mixed flame
burns with the gas disbursed into the air and can burn in a
flash fire/fireball, deflagration, or detonation. In a
diffusion flame, air is drawn to the base of a stationary
flame and diffuses into the combustion flame front. A
flame jet is a diffusion flame.
40
A deflagration of gas
dispersed in air is a rapid combustion event, where the
combustion wave front moves at subsonic ( m/s, but still
rapid) speed through the gas-air mixture. Deflagrations
are explosions because there is overpressure, heat release,
and generation of debris missiles.
Deflagrations have wide gas concentration limits in
air, as seen in Table IV, and ignitions at the lean and rich
limits tend to produce low energy and low pressure
outputs. Deflagrations can be ignited by very modest
energies.
41
However, Baker and Tang note that if the
ignition source is weak (< Joules) the flame front will not
accelerate sufficiently to create a shock wave that will
damage the surroundings.
42
That is, a weak mJ ignition
source would most likely lead to a flash fire/fireball
deflagration with minimal overpressure rather than a
strong deflagration with air blast overpressure effects.
Deflagrations of pre-mixed gas in air are often called
unconfined vapor cloud explosions (UVCEs).
40,41
UVCEs
tend to be inefficient, low yield combustion events, many
being 1 to 2% of the heat of combustion of the total fuel
available. Gugan does have data on a few events that
reached up to 65% yield, but most of the recorded events
were much less than 5%.
43
Many UVCEs occurred with
very large releases, 30 or more tons of material released
from a process plant or set of rail tank cars. A refueling
station would typically be on the low end of UCVE
release masses. Typical threshold quantities of gaseous
fuels for chemical safety analysis are on the order of
5 tons, per 40 CFR 68; gasoline is not listed.
44
Gugan
notes that UVCE analyses used a 2% yield when
establishing separation distances for chemical process
facility site planning.
43
However, 40 CFR 68.25 directs
that 10% yield of available energy be used in a vapor
cloud explosion calculation when assessing the explosion
damage zone.
44
Deflagrations can be serious events,
presenting radiant heat release and overpressure to on-
and off-site personnel and plant equipment.
Detonations are the most severe explosions,
generating the highest overpressures, heat energy releases,
and kinetic energy debris missiles. Detonations require
higher concentrations of gas in air, typically some
turbulence or reflection to speed up the combustion wave
front, and a strong ignition source (Joules to kilo Joules)
to initiate a rapid combustion wave front.
45
It is also
possible to “run up” or experience a deflagration-to-
detonation transition in events with appropriate
precursors. These precursors are a high mass (tons) of gas
mixed in air, reflection or turbulence on the deflagration
wave front to speed it up, and a reasonably strong ignition
source to create an initially high m/s velocity combustion
wave front.
Hydrogen combustion differs from other combusting
hydrocarbons. As Ringland
46
points out, hydrogen has the
widest flammable range, but flammable limit ranges in
open air environments tend to not be as important as the
lower limit value because dispersion and diffusion in air
act to limit gas concentrations to small values. Hydrogen
is much lighter than air and tends to rise no matter what
the gas temperature or room air temperature. In general,
considering refueling operations under an awning or
pavilion, small hydrogen leaks that are naturally buoyant
should disperse to air quite readily. Swain and Shriber
studied gaseous fuel and gasoline releases in a residential
garage and the hydrogen easily dissipated, leaving only a
small flammable region (even with a large leak of
1,000 L/hr).
47
The same was true for methane, but
propane and gasoline vapors lingered in the garage.
Unless there is a static discharge ignition or some other
ignition source at or near the hydrogen release point (e.g.,
an operating automobile engine, overheated engine parts,
or a flame), hydrogen gas could be expected to dissipate
to the ambient environment. Larger leaks pose more of a
concern to persons nearby and more of a combustion
hazard. Escaping hydrogen gas can generate its own static
charge; a static discharge to ground from the edge of the
gas jet is small but sufficient energy to ignite the
hydrogen.
48
This phenomenon has been seen in several
situations with gaseous hydrogen and cryogen boiloff
hydrogen release.
5
Hydrogen flames are typically non-luminous to the
naked eye unless some carbon-based fuel is also
combusting with the hydrogen (e.g., paint, rubber hose, or
electrical insulation). To avoid walking into a hydrogen
flame, a fire protection good practice at suspected fire
locations is to hold out a broom and toss dirt ahead of the
broom to probe the area. When the broom bristles and any
combustibles in the dirt reach the edge of the hydrogen
fire they will incandesce, immediately depicting the edge
of the fire.
48
Of course, isolating any break locations is
prudent from a safety as well as economic perspective.
There have been a few hydrogen powered vehicles,
but the operating experience data are insufficient to draw
any conclusions about hydrogen vehicle reliability or
safety. Some initial estimates of hydrogen and other fuel
ignition probabilities given a spill from road tankers
(generally carrying up to 8,000-gal inventories) are given
in Table V.
45
These values tend to be large because they
are only estimates. Operating experiences will provide
data to refine these estimates.
Table V. Conditional Probabilities of Gas or Vapor
Ignition Given a Spill
Fuel Small Spill Large Spill
Immediate ignition upon spill initiation
Gasoline 0.15 0.5
Hydrogen 0.5 0.9
Methane 0.25 0.9
Propane 0.25 0.75
Delayed ignition after spill initiation
Gasoline 0.04 0.05
Hydrogen 0.45 0.09
Methane 0.50 0.09
Propane 0.68 0.23
Note: small spills are  10% of tank inventory; large
spills are 100% of tank inventory, based on 8,000-gal
inventories.
An important aspect of all three gaseous fuels is that
they are naturally odorless. The Code of Federal
Regulations states that a combustible gas in a distribution
line must contain a natural odorant so a concentration in
air of one-fifth of the lower flammable limit is readily
detectable by a person with a normal sense of smell.
49
Rivkin stated that depending on the technology used with
hydrogen fuel, the hydrogen may not be odorized for
safety.
20
The odorant, such as ethyl mercaptan, could foul
the membranes in fuel cells. Odorant cannot be used with
cryogenic liquids because the widely used odorizing
compounds will freeze out of the liquefied gas. Gasoline
does not require an odorant; it carries an inherent solvent
smell that is easily detected by persons with a typical
sense of smell. Odorants are certainly a useful, but not
infallible, safety measure. Not all persons have a normal
sense of smell.
50,51
Another odorant issue is that an
odorized gas leaking from an underground pipe can be
cleansed of odorant by the soil the gas passes through.
Like hydrogen, methane is lighter than air. Methane
tends to burn with a blue-yellow flame that is easily
recognized. As seen in Table IV, methane requires a spark
of over a quarter-milliJoule for ignition in air.
Chamberlain and Modarres present a quantitative risk
assessment of CNG buses.
52
The conclusions were that
CNG-fueled buses were more susceptible to fires than
diesel-fueled buses by a factor of about two. Note that one
reason diesel fuel was adopted is because diesel fuel does
not evolve flammable vapors until it is heated and is
therefore safer than gasoline. Thus, the CNG results are
not surprising because any CNG leak is always
flammable. The risk frequencies for bus fires found by
Chamberlain and Modarres are shown in Table VI.
Table VI. Risk Frequencies for Bus Fires with Given
Cause
Cause
Risk Frequency
(per bus-yr)
Electrostatic discharge of CNG 1.4E05
Operator error 4E02
Catastrophic failure of bus or station
hardware
1.4E03
Accident impacts mainly due to
collision
3.6E02
Melchers and Feutrill give occurrence probabilities
for LPG ignition given an LPG leak at a refueling
station.
53
The authors assumed 0.9 for immediate ignition
(within 10 s, no mixing in air), 0.75 for early ignition, 0.5
for delayed ignition, and 0.33 for late ignition. Melchers
and Feutrill recognized that these values are subject to
considerable uncertainty, so they used very conservative
estimates and attempted to incorporate data from the
petroleum industry to support assumptions. The
immediate ignition of 0.9 does not compare well with the
0.25 value from Table V, but the delayed ignition value of
0.5 compares reasonably well to the 0.68 value from the
table. These data arise from speculative sources because
the chemical process industry tends to be less highly
regulated than the nuclear power industry. Even gasoline
service station fires are not always centrally reported;
only state fire marshals tend to be aware of fires at public
stations in their own state. Fortunately, despite non-
centralized reporting and difficulty with statistical data,
both methane and propane are odorized for safety, to help
alert people to leaks.
Gasoline has inherent fire hazards. In typical gasoline
fires, the liquid gasoline burns in a flowing or stationary
pool (dikes, bund walls) and vapor burns above the liquid
surface. Obviously, confined pools are more readily dealt
with than a burning, flowing liquid. The flashpoint of a
liquid is defined as the lowest temperature at which a
liquid will evolve enough vapor to ignite. Because
gasoline is a low-temperature flashpoint material (43°C
[45°F]), use of water for extinguishment is not optimum;
water at 10 or 15°C (50 or 59°F) will not cool the
gasoline sufficiently to preclude vapor production.
Gasoline fires are usually extinguished by reducing
contact with air. The gasoline pool surface is often
covered with low-expansion foam;
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water mist or fog can
also be used but care must be taken not to spread the
gasoline because gasoline floats on water. Gasoline
should not be washed or swept into sewers because it
would evolve vapor into a confined location that might
allow a strong deflagration or a detonation. When
gasoline burns, the flame is a bright orange and the smoke
is dark, so the fire is easily noticed.
Gasoline vapors are heavier than air and tend to stay
in low areas or flow along the ground. The vapors diffuse
or mix slowly in air unless driven to mix by air currents;
only large gasoline spills have resulted in deflagration
explosions. Gasoline also rarely has a vapor cloud
explosion. Gasoline has suffered from boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs), where a gasoline
tank is externally heated, such as by a pool fire. The
gasoline in the tank boils and the tank either vents (adding
its vented vapor to the fire but preserving the tank
structure) or overpressurizes and ruptures (adding its
shrapnel and gasoline inventory to the fire).
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Fortunately,
BLEVEs are rare events and are usually associated with
refineries rather than dispensers (although an LPG
BLEVE has occurred in a refueling station).
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While retail
gasoline service stations are routinely accepted by the
public and are considered to be benign, some station fires
occur every year. NFPA data give a quote of 1,530
vehicle fires initiated with vehicle fuel at U.S. public
service stations in the 5 years between 1994 and 1998.
56
Using the Statistical Abstract of the U.S., there were
126,889 retail service stations in the U.S. in 1997.
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Assuming this count remains reasonably constant over the
1994–1998 time period, the fire frequency is 1,530/[(5
years)(126,889)] or 2.4E03 fires/station-year. McCarthy
et al. also presented some information on gasoline station
fires.
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For California gasoline stations with vapor
recovery from the refueling port, gasoline fires at stations
were 8.41 fires per billion gallons sold over 1982–1984.
For the fourteen states without gasoline vapor recovery at
the refueling port, the fire rate was 17.02 fires per billion
gallons sold. To convert these reported values for
comparison with the calculated value above, an
assumption of a modest, national average sales volume
station was used (90,000 gallons/month or
 1E+06 gallons/year). Conversion gave 8.4E03 fires
per station-year for stations with no vapor recovery and
1.7E02 fires per station-year for stations with recovery.
The 1980s and 1990s data are in reasonably good
agreement; a fire frequency on the order of magnitude of
1E03/year appears to be correct. This point estimate
would be classified as an unlikely event in the DOE safety
framework.
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Nabours discusses the fact that personal static
electricity has caused some increase in station fires during
recent years.
60
The Petroleum Equipment Institute,
American Petroleum Institute, and the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) have all
issued warnings about static electricity during
refueling.
61–63
Pratt describes the static accumulation
process during refueling of people re-entering a car and
sliding on the car seat, building up a charge of at most
several microCoulombs.
64
Greason also calculated similar
values.
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Then the person gets out of the car to remove the
fill nozzle. If a person has conductive footwear, there is
no ignition concern—any static charge accumulation will
dissipate within one or two walking steps. If the person
touches some metal of the car body while exiting the car
they will also be discharged before coming near the
gasoline fill port. If the person does not discharge, then a
spark up to 20 mJ energy or more could occur when the
person takes hold of the dispenser nozzle. Considering
that gasoline has a small lower flammable limit and the
region around the fill port is vapor rich because entering
liquid forces tank vapors out to the air, it is not surprising
that a flash fire could occur.
Another event of concern is the automobile drive-
away event, which is when a vehicle leaves a gasoline
pump with the nozzle still attached to the vehicle’s fill
port.
66
In the past, such events could lead to gasoline
spilling onto the concrete surrounding the pump island.
There is an engineering control that has been built into
hose lines, however, called a break-away connector.
67
The
breakaway connector shuts a butterfly valve when pulled
apart so that gasoline spills are limited. These connectors
can be resealed if the nozzle end of the hose is retrieved.
Polling two self-service gasoline stations (a five-pump
island station of 150,000 gallons/month and a four-pump
island station with  55,000 gallons/month) in Idaho
Falls, Idaho, for events over the past 6 and 8 years,
respectively, revealed a tentative point estimate frequency
for drive-away events of 0.5/station-year for these two
stations. There is no reason to expect different results in
other regions using self-service stations, but a larger
sampling would give a higher statistical confidence in the
frequency value. This 0.5/station-year frequency is large
enough to fall into the operational events classification in
the Department of Energy safety framework.
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To compare these fuels, a likely event of a small leak
of a few gallons is used as a basis for comparison. Any of
the three gaseous fuels stored at room temperature under
pressure and leaking a few kg will pose the hazard of
potentially igniting the gas jet at the release point with a
weak ignitor. Coutts examined U.S. national fire data and
calculated that there was a 0.1 average probability of a
gas explosion given ignition of a flammable gas, with
lower and upper bounds of 0.03 and 0.4, respectively.
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This estimate was based mainly on natural gas indoor use
in the U.S. This 0.1 probability value is useful when
developing gas release scenarios. According to the data
presented by Coutts, a flash fire or fireball is the most
likely result of a pre-mixed gas ignition in air. Table V
gives the estimated probabilities of ignition given a spill.
Hydrogen may ignite itself, and the other gases would
need a low energy external ignition source. Even if the
gaseous fuels are stored as cryogens and a small breach
occurs, the exhausting cold gas could be ignited by a
reasonably strong ignitor. A burning gas jet could present
significant hazards, including flame impingement on a
person, radiant heating injuries, and ignition of secondary
fires. A few kg of gas in a puff release to the air (e.g.,
relief valve lift and reseat) without combusting at the
release point could be ignited early by a small energy
spark and, by virtue of the small mass, produce a flash
fire without any appreciable overpressure. Radiant heat
from a flash fire could possibly ignite secondary fires,
burning persons nearby and possibly igniting their
clothing. A few gallons of gasoline released as a liquid
spilled from a refueling port would seek the lowest level
and would evolve flammable vapors. The vapors could be
ignited by a small energy spark and the heat given off
could ignite secondary fires (e.g., a person’s clothing).
For this comparison of small leaks, the gaseous fuels
would appear to offer the highest risk of either a burning
jet or a burning cloud, and hydrogen has the highest
ignition probability. For gasoline, the ignition probability
in Table V is reasonably low, and the liquid will only
offer a pool fire.
Gasoline has had a long history of more than 100
years of usage in the U.S.
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and its properties are well
known by fire departments. Initially, gasoline was sold in
tins and bottles off the shelf in mercantile stores. Then
storage tanks and pumps were used because the demand
for gasoline increased and bulk liquid handling was
needed to meet the demand. Over time, appropriate codes
and standards were developed to provide safety in
dispensing and handling gasoline fuel. Other gaseous
fuels, notably CNG and LPG, have found use as vehicle
fuels in the U.S. and abroad. Both fuels have had codes
developed for proper handling.
17–19
It is expected that as
alternate fuel usage continues, the safety standards and
public appreciation of the hazards will mature. This can
also be true for hydrogen fuel if usage increases. As an
initial point of application, using CNG standards should
provide a level of safety with use of hydrogen fuel.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a safety comparison of
several gaseous motor fuels and the presently used liquid
gasoline fuel. Because all motor vehicle fuels have a
necessary requirement for flammability and high energy
release when burning, no fuel can be considered safe.
Regarding physical hazards, gasoline was the most benign
of the four fuels discussed because gasoline is stored as a
low-pressure, ambient-temperature liquid and uses a low
flow rate that is easily dispensed. All four fuels have a
concern for electrostatic charge production and safe
dissipation of electrostatic energy. The gaseous fuels
currently require, or will require, more robust engineering
controls than gasoline to provide safety in refueling
operations to protect against pressure and/or cryogenic
hazards.
Regarding toxicity of fuels, gasoline is the highest
toxicity fuel of the four because the benzene constituent
of gasoline is a known carcinogen and bulk gasoline is
labeled as a possible carcinogen. Gasoline intrusion into
the environment is a continual source of concern. The
three gaseous fuels considered here are essentially non-
toxic except that they displace air and could lead to
asphyxia, which is not credible in open air refueling
situations. The gaseous fuels pose much less hazard to the
environment than gasoline. All four fuels discussed here
would pose a potential asphyxiation hazard if they leaked
into an unventilated passenger compartment of an
automobile or into an enclosed space, such as a garage.
Combustion is not easily judged. In situations where
a few gallons of fuel are spilled, a low flammable limit
presents a higher hazard. Spilling a few gallon-
equivalents of gaseous fuel would allow the possibility of
a jet flame ignition or a cloud ignition, while gasoline
would simply evolve vapor above the pool of liquid and
the vapor might be ignited. All four fuels have low mJ
spark ignition energies. Qualitatively the overall risks of
gaseous fuels versus gasoline should be fairly close. This
research has also shown that gasoline is ubiquitous in our
society and is understood by all fire departments,
followed by LPG. The other gaseous fuels are not as well
understood by firefighters throughout the U.S.
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